WHEN I BECAME governor of the Banque de France in 2015, a friend predicted plain sailing(一帆风顺). The decade that followed was anything but(绝不是). For us central bankers—stability-lovers and devout internationalists—deeply held convictions were tested. These years could be viewed as purely chaotic and negative, with slowing economic growth, rising debt and surging populism(民粹主义浪潮). Yet beyond this bleak picture(黯淡的景象), I draw four vital lessons.
2015年我成为法国央行行长时，一位朋友预言将一帆风顺。而接下来的十年绝非如此。对于我们这些热爱稳定、虔诚的国际主义者的央行行长来说，根深蒂固的信念受到了考验。这些年可以被视为纯粹混乱和消极的：经济增长放缓、债务上升、民粹主义泛滥。然而，在这幅阴暗图景之外，我得出了四条重要教训。
First, monetary policy worked, albeit(尽管) not exactly as expected. In 2020-21 central banks confronted the risk of deflation triggered by the covid-19 pandemic; and from 2022 onwards, an inflation surge amplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Perfection is not the benchmark, but progress has been tangible(实实在在的). Inflation was brought down without the recession many feared—a soft landing, by any definition(按任何定义).
第一，货币政策行之有效，尽管并非完全如预期。2020-21年，央行面临新冠疫情引发的通缩风险；2022年起，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰加剧了通胀飙升。完美不是基准，但进展实实在在。通胀在未引发许多人担心的衰退的情况下被压低——按任何定义，这都是软着陆。
But legitimate pride should not be mistaken for hubris(傲慢自大). Monetary policy in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 relied on an expanded arsenal of unconventional tools. Some proved remarkably effective: all balance-sheet instruments, including quantitative easing(量化宽松). Two other, more Promethean(普罗米修斯式的) instruments appear less convincing today: long-dated forward guidance(前瞻指引), which sought to forge the future, and negative interest rates, which strained economic common sense.
但合理的自豪不应被误认为狂妄。在2007-09年全球金融危机之后，货币政策依赖于一系列扩大的非常规工具。有些工具被证明相当有效：所有资产负债表工具，包括量化宽松。另外两种更具“普罗米修斯”色彩的工具如今显得不那么令人信服：长期前瞻指引（试图塑造未来）和负利率（违背经济常识）。