When Russia launched its full-scale invasion(全面入侵) of Ukraine in 2022 France and Germany spent nearly the same amount on defence. By 2029 Germany’s defence budget is expected to swell(膨胀；增加) to at least €150bn ($174bn)—roughly double France’s. For European security, German rearmament is plainly welcome. Yet in Paris the prospect also prompts discomfort. The risk, General Fabien Mandon, head of the armed forces, told a Senate hearing last month, is that in five years France “falls behind” its neighbour in the field it has hitherto dominated.(风险在于，法国武装力量总参谋长法比安·曼东将军上月在参议院听证会上表示，五年后法国在自己迄今占据主导地位的领域会“落后于”其邻国。)
2022年俄罗斯发动全面入侵乌克兰时，法国和德国的国防开支大致相当。到2029年，德国国防预算预计将膨胀至至少1500亿欧元（1740亿美元）——大约是法国的两倍。对欧洲安全而言，德国重新武装显然值得欢迎。但在巴黎，这一前景也引发了不安。法国武装力量总参谋长法比安·曼东将军上月在参议院听证会上表示，风险在于五年后法国在自己迄今占据主导地位的领域“落后于”其邻国。
The Franco-German link was forged around an implicit equilibrium(平衡；均衡): France carries the military burden, while Germany provides economic might. As the EU’s only nuclear power, and with a strong expeditionary and strategic culture, France is used to taking the lead. For example, Emmanuel Macron, the president, has partnered with Britain to set up a “coalition of the willing” for Ukraine to be deployed in the event of a ceasefire. Germany has signed up, but Friedrich Merz, the chancellor, is reluctant to commit ground troops. Indeed French military types are dismissive(轻蔑的；不屑一顾的) about Germany’s low appetite for risk, and its tendency to need American reassurance. “We have to be able to think about waging war differently, and without America, but they are absolutely not ready to think about this,” says a French military official. On most defence matters, the French still find that they are far more in tune with the British.
法德关系建立在一种默示的平衡之上：法国承担军事负担，德国提供经济实力。作为欧盟唯一的核大国，并拥有强大的远征和战略文化，法国习惯于占据主导地位。例如，总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙与英国合作建立了一个“愿意者联盟”，以便在停火时部署到乌克兰。德国已经加入，但总理弗里德里希·默茨不愿意承诺派遣地面部队。事实上，法国军方人士对德国低风险偏好以及依赖美国保证的倾向不屑一顾。“我们必须能够思考如何在没有美国的情况下以不同方式发动战争，但他们绝对没有准备好考虑这一点，”一位法国军官说。在大多数防务问题上，法国人仍然觉得自己与英国人更为合拍。
Across Europe Mr Merz’s promise to make the Bundeswehr “the strongest conventional army in Europe”, with a 40% increase in troops by 2035, is broadly applauded(被赞扬；受到鼓掌欢迎). Mr Macron has long argued for greater European “strategic autonomy(战略自主)”. A bigger German contribution could help achieve that ambition. Poland and the Baltics are reassured by the prospect, as is Italy. A poll last year suggested that 48% of Poles think a reinforced Bundeswehr would improve Poland’s security, with just 25% disagreeing. Yet, behind closed doors, the French are uneasy—and not only out of frustration that they do not have the fiscal space to spend as much. “It’s the elephant in the room(房间里的大象（指明显但被回避的问题）),” says a top French military figure. That Germany might have the biggest army in Europe is “unthinkable for us”.
在整个欧洲，默茨总理承诺要使联邦国防军成为“欧洲最强的常规军队”，到2035年增加40%的兵力，这得到了广泛赞扬。马克龙总统长期以来一直主张加强欧洲的“战略自主”。德国更大的贡献可能有助于实现这一雄心。波兰和波罗的海国家以及意大利都对此前景感到放心。去年的一项民意调查显示，48%的波兰人认为加强后的联邦国防军将改善波兰的安全，只有25%的人不同意。然而，在闭门会议上，法国人感到不安——这不仅仅是因为他们没有财政空间花那么多钱。“这是房间里的大象，”一位法国高级军方人物说。德国可能拥有欧洲最大的军队，这对我们来说是“不可想象的”。