THE MEMORANDUM of Understanding between America and Iran on ending their war had barely been signed when it faced its first test in Lebanon, as Israeli forces and Hizbullah continued attacking each other, lending weight to(为……提供支持) intelligence conclusions in Washington, DC that Israel would try to scuttle(破坏，阻挠) it. Such fears may, however, be misplaced(放错地方的；不恰当的).
美国与伊朗之间关于结束战争的谅解备忘录刚刚签署，就在黎巴嫩面临了第一次考验——以色列军队和真主党继续互相攻击，这支持了华盛顿情报机构的结论：以色列将试图破坏该协议。然而，这种担忧可能被放错了地方。
Israelis are dismayed(沮丧的，惊愕的) that President Donald Trump—until recently, at least, very popular among them—would strike(达成（协议）) a deal that they believe disregarded(无视，不理会) their national-security interests. Their complaints go beyond(超越，超出) the MOU’s limits on Israeli action in Lebanon: the nuclear issue is unresolved; it makes no reference to reducing Iran’s missile capabilities or its support for proxies; the sanctions relief and other economic carrots promise a lifeline(生命线，救生索) to a regime many Israelis believe could have been toppled(推翻，颠覆). Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, did not want to end the war, and certainly not on these terms.
以色列人感到沮丧，因为唐纳德·特朗普总统——至少直到最近，他在以色列人中还很受欢迎——达成了一项他们认为无视其国家安全利益的协议。他们的抱怨超越了谅解备忘录对以色列在黎巴嫩行动的限制：核问题未解决；协议未提及减少伊朗的导弹能力或其支持代理人的内容；制裁减免和其他经济诱因为一个许多以色列人认为本可以推翻的政权提供了生命线。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡不想结束战争，当然更不想以这些条件结束。
He will thus have strong motives(动机，目的) to undermine(削弱，暗中破坏) the agreement. Since the Hamas attacks on October 7th 2023, Israel has unleashed(释放，发动) its military power not only in Gaza but across the region, with little to no pushback(几乎没有反对) from Presidents Biden or Trump. Israel’s political elite(精英，上层人士) largely sees Iran as the source of its gravest security challenges and views diplomacy as futile(无用的，徒劳的). Despite American frustration over Israeli strikes, Mr Netanyahu may believe Mr Trump lacks the ability to force Israel to permanently halt military operations or withdraw from southern Lebanon, which it has reoccupied.(尽管美国对以色列的打击感到沮丧，内塔尼亚胡可能认为特朗普缺少能力迫使以色列永久停止军事行动或从南黎巴嫩撤军——以军已重新占领该地。) After all, the president has done little to enforce his own “peace plan” in Gaza and end Israel’s occupation of more than 60% of the strip.
因此，他将有强烈的动机破坏该协议。自2023年10月7日哈马斯袭击以来，以色列不仅在加沙，而且在整个地区释放了军事力量，几乎没有受到拜登或特朗普总统的反对。以色列政治精英大多将伊朗视为最严峻安全挑战的源头，并认为外交是徒劳的。尽管美国对以色列的打击感到沮丧，内塔尼亚胡可能认为特朗普缺少能力迫使以色列永久停止军事行动或从南黎巴嫩撤军——以军已重新占领该地。毕竟，总统几乎没有执行自己在加沙的“和平计划”，也未结束以色列对加沙地带60%以上地区的占领。