An editor of The Economist once said: "We are a paper of opinion and views. We stick our neck out(冒险，出头) and consequently(因此，结果) risk having it chopped(砍断，切除) from time to time." The oil price has delivered such a blow(给予沉重一击). At the end of April, almost two months after America and Israel attacked Iran, we said oil traders were in "la-la land(梦幻之境，脱离现实)" thinking that oil prices would fall to $88 by the end of the year. Today Brent crude(布伦特原油) costs just over $70 a barrel. Our prediction went about as well as the war.(我们的预测和战争一样糟糕。)
《经济学人》的一位编辑曾说过：“我们是一份发表观点和看法的报纸。我们敢于冒险，因而时不时地面临被打击的风险。”油价就给了我们这样一击。4月底，在美国和以色列袭击伊朗近两个月后，我们曾说石油交易商处于“梦幻之境”，认为油价到年底会跌至88美元。如今布伦特原油每桶仅略高于70美元。我们的预测和那场战争一样糟糕。
We got it wrong for two reasons. First, we thought that America and Iran would hold out against(坚决反对，拒不妥协) a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz: America because Mr Trump deludedly(自欺欺人地) thought he held the whip hand(掌握主动权，处于支配地位), Iran because its regime knew its people could be made to endure more pain. In fact, facing the fury(暴怒，愤怒) of American motorists, Mr Trump all but folded(几乎屈服了), preventing a disaster. Since the two parties struck a provisional deal(临时协议) in June, enough oil has been getting out of the Gulf to reassure markets that supply is coming back online(供应正在恢复), even if the future of the strait remains uncertain.
我们搞错有两个原因。第一，我们原以为美国和伊朗会拒绝恢复霍尔木兹海峡通航的协议：美国是因为特朗普先生自欺欺人地认为他掌握着主动权，伊朗则因其政权知道本国人民可以承受更多痛苦。事实上，面对美国驾车者的怒火，特朗普先生几乎屈服了，从而避免了一场灾难。自双方在6月达成临时协议以来，有足够多的石油从海湾流出，让市场确信供应正在恢复，尽管该海峡的未来仍不确定。
Our second oversight(疏忽，失察) was, like others, not anticipating the staggering(令人震惊的，巨大的) degree to which China would be able to slash(大幅削减) its oil imports. Crude imports are 5m barrels a day lower than a year ago, despite the fall in prices. China has cut its demand and shored up(支撑，加固) supply. Its oil reserves are opaque(不透明的，模糊的)—many barrels are hidden from satellites underground, and there is a blurred line(模糊的界限) between official reserves and corporate inventories. But they have been shown to be a powerful buffer(缓冲器，缓冲物).
我们的第二个失误是，和其他人一样，没有预见到中国削减石油进口的惊人程度。原油进口量比一年前每天减少500万桶，尽管油价下跌。中国削减了需求并支撑了供应。其石油储备不透明——很多桶油藏在地下躲过卫星，官方储备与公司库存之间界限模糊。但它们已被证明是一个强大的缓冲器。