Only a few years ago Shein looked unstoppable(势不可挡的). Its novel business model—using oodles of data and clever algorithms to spot fashion trends and generate new designs, which its network of Chinese suppliers stitch for a pittance—proved a hit in Western markets.(其新颖的商业模式——利用海量数据和算法捕捉潮流、生成设计，由中国供应商以极低成本缝制——在西方市场大获成功。) Americans in particular spent endless hours scrolling(滚动浏览) through the $3 blouses and $5 khakis(卡其裤) available on its app. In 2022, shortly after it moved its headquarters(总部) from Nanjing to Singapore, the company was valued(估值，重视) by private investors, including America’s General Atlantic, at $100bn.
就在几年前，希音看起来还势不可挡。其新颖的商业模式——利用海量数据和巧妙算法捕捉时尚潮流、生成新设计，再由其中国供应商网络以极低的成本缝制——在西方市场大获成功。尤其是美国人，花费无数时间在其应用上浏览售价3美元的衬衫和5美元的卡其裤。2022年，在将总部从南京迁至新加坡后不久，该公司被包括美国泛大西洋投资集团在内的私人投资者估值高达1000亿美元。
On September 1st Shein plans to list(上市) on the Hong Kong stock exchange—reportedly at a valuation of just $27bn. Its business has deteriorated(恶化) dramatically. In 2024 it generated $39bn in revenue, up by 21% from the year before. In 2025 sales grew by only 8%, to $42bn, and in the first quarter of 2026 they increased by a mere(仅仅) 1%, year on year(同比). In 2024 the company’s net profit reached $3.4bn. It is now operating at a loss(亏损经营). What went wrong?
9月1日，希音计划在香港证券交易所上市——据报道估值仅为270亿美元。其业务已急剧恶化。2024年，其营收为390亿美元，同比增长21%。2025年，销售额仅增长8%，达到420亿美元；2026年第一季度，同比仅增长1%。2024年，公司净利润达到34亿美元。如今却处于亏损状态。到底哪里出了问题？
Shein’s business model was undoubtedly inventive(有创造力的). The prospectus(招股说明书) for its listing says that it offers more than 2m distinct(不同的，明显的) items of clothing, with 4,700 new ones added every day. Its 280m customers worldwide—excluding China, where it does not sell its wares(商品，货物)—put in(提交，投入) four orders a year, on average, suggesting many are not perturbed(不安的，烦恼的) by the occasionally shoddy(劣质的) quality of its products.
希音的商业模式无疑具有创新性。其上市招股书称，它提供超过200万种不同的服装单品，每天新增4700种。其全球2.8亿客户——不包括中国，因为希音不在中国销售产品——平均每年下单四次，这表明许多人并不为其产品偶尔低劣的质量所困扰。