One day in 1992 Stanley Druckenmiller marched(大步走，坚定地走) into his boss’s office, saying: “George, I’m going to sell $5.5bn-worth of British pounds tonight and buy Deutsche marks.” George was George Soros and Mr Druckenmiller, his protégé(门徒，受保护人), was running his “Quantum” hedge fund. The idea was that the Bank of England was trying to sustain an unsustainable exchange-rate peg which speculative pressure could break, forcing the depreciation of the pound and netting Quantum a huge profit.(这个想法是，英国央行试图维持一个不可持续的汇率挂钩，投机压力可能打破它，迫使英镑贬值，为量子基金带来巨额利润。) But the $5.5bn would put 100% of the fund’s assets behind one wildly risky bet. “That is the most ridiculous use of money management I ever heard,” Mr Soros said. “We should have 200% of our net worth in this trade.”
1992年的一天，斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒大步走进老板的办公室，说：“乔治，我今晚要卖出55亿英镑，买入德国马克。”乔治就是乔治·索罗斯，而德鲁肯米勒是他的门徒，当时正管理着他的“量子”对冲基金。他们的想法是，英国央行正试图维持一个不可持续的汇率挂钩机制，而投机压力可能打破这一机制，迫使英镑贬值，从而为量子基金带来巨额利润。但55亿美元将把基金100%的资产押注在一个极其冒险的赌注上。“这是我听过的最荒谬的资金管理方式，”索罗斯说，“我们应该把净资产的200%都押在这笔交易上。”
It worked, and Mr Soros became the man who broke the Bank of England. Plenty, including Mr Druckenmiller, reckon he thereby demonstrated two cardinal(主要的，基本的) virtue(美德，优点)s of great investors: the wisdom to spot a winning chance and the nerve to bet the house on it. Perhaps. But for Buttonwood’s money(依梧桐树专栏之见) Mr Soros also demonstrated two other crucial, and underrated(被低估的), virtues. What a great investor really needs is a big dose of(一大剂，大量) luck and a distinctly odd character.
这一招奏效了，索罗斯成了击败英格兰银行的人。包括德鲁肯米勒在内的许多人认为，他由此展现了伟大投资者的两大核心美德：发现获胜机会的智慧，以及孤注一掷的胆量。也许吧。但在梧桐树专栏看来，索罗斯还展现了另外两个至关重要却被低估的美德。伟大投资者真正需要的是一大剂运气和一种极其古怪的性格。
Mr Soros was certainly lucky. He was right that the peg was unsustainable over the long term and, once bank traders and other hedge funds piled in(涌入，蜂拥而入) alongside him, victory might have been inevitable(不可避免的). But they might also have chosen differently, siding with(支持，站在…一边) the central bankers and steamrollering(碾压，压倒性击败) Mr Soros instead.
索罗斯当然很幸运。他正确地认识到，从长期来看，这个汇率挂钩机制是不可持续的，而且一旦银行交易员和其他对冲基金与他一起涌入，胜利或许就不可避免了。但他们也可能做出不同的选择，站在央行官员一边，反过来碾压索罗斯。