Many dreams haunt(萦绕；困扰) the corridors of European Union institutions in Brussels, the ghosts of summits past. Perhaps one day the continent’s administrators could spur the growth of home-grown tech champions, thus ending Europeans’ reliance on Silicon Valley giants. Maybe, in this life or the next, Eurocrat(欧盟官僚)s might devise a way to make France stick to the bloc’s budget rules. Still more improbably, Brussels-based mandarins could one day find a way to forge a unified foreign policy that satisfies the union’s 27 member states, thus allowing the continent to speak to the world with a single voice.(更不可能的是，布鲁塞尔的官老爷们有朝一日能找到办法，打造出一套让27个成员国都满意的统一外交政策，从而让欧洲用一个声音对世界说话。) That’ll show the Americans, Chinese and Russians that the EU is a force to be reckoned with(不可小觑的力量)!
布鲁塞尔欧盟机构的走廊里游荡着许多梦想，都是历次峰会的幽灵。也许有一天，欧洲的行政官员能推动本土科技巨头成长，从而终结欧洲人对硅谷巨头的依赖。也许，无论今生还是来世，欧盟官僚能想出让法国遵守欧盟预算规则的办法。更不可能的是，布鲁塞尔的官老爷们有朝一日能找到办法，打造出一套让27个成员国都满意的统一外交政策，从而让欧洲用一个声音对世界说话。那样就能让美国人、中国人和俄罗斯人看看，欧盟是一支不可小觑的力量！
Reality has a way of puncturing such plans. Neither the effort to rival America’s IT industry nor that to restrain French budgets has achieved much so far. The notion that Europe might be able to act as one in diplomatic matters, however, is getting a fresh boost. Plans crafted by Germany and France, the EU’s two biggest members, envision a rewiring of the club’s diplomatic apparatus. In an age of geopolitical uncertainty, finding a way for the EU to co-ordinate its foreign policy seems urgent. Yet the fault for any current dysfunction(运转失灵；功能障碍) lies less with the diplomats than with their political masters. Blaming EU foreign-service wallahs for the bloc’s lack of diplomatic clout is like blaming deckhands for the sinking of a boat which the admirals on the bridge steered onto the rocks.(把欧盟外交影响力不足归咎于欧盟外交部门的人员，就好比把船只沉没归咎于甲板水手，而真正把船开上礁石的，是舰桥上的海军上将。) How does one carry out a common foreign policy when, much of the time, there is no common foreign policy to carry out?
现实总有办法戳破这类计划。无论是试图与美国IT产业竞争，还是约束法国预算，迄今都收效甚微。然而，欧洲或许能在外交事务上统一行动这一想法，正获得新的推动力。欧盟两大成员国德国和法国制定的方案，设想对欧盟的外交机构进行重新布线。在地缘政治充满不确定性的时代，为欧盟找到协调外交政策的办法似乎十分紧迫。然而，当前任何运转失灵，过错与其说在外交官，不如说在他们的政治主子。把欧盟外交影响力不足归咎于欧盟外交部门的人员，就好比把船只沉没归咎于甲板水手，而真正把船开上礁石的，是舰桥上的海军上将。当多数时候根本不存在共同外交政策可供执行时，又何谈执行共同外交政策呢？
All sides agree that something is not quite right with the EU’s diplomatic machinery. A proto-(前缀：原始的；初期的)foreign ministry set up in 2011 in the wake of(在……之后；紧随……而来) the last big update of the bloc’s treaty, it is known inelegantly(不优雅地；笨拙地) as the European External Action Service (EEAS). It is meant to be answerable(对……负责的) both to the EU’s national capitals and to the bloc’s institutions. The result is a jumbled(杂乱无章的) mess. Instead of having a foreign minister, the EU has a “High Representative/Vice-President”—not a job title that Henry Kissinger(美国前国务卿，现实主义外交代表人物) would have recognised. Since 2024 the position has been held by Kaja Kallas, a former prime minister of Estonia known for her hawkish(鹰派的；强硬的) views on Russia. Despite being the highest-profile HR/VP yet, she has had little more success than her three predecessor(前任；前辈)s did.
各方都同意，欧盟的外交机器有点不对劲。它成立于2011年，是欧盟上一次大幅修订条约后设立的准外交部，名字起得颇为笨拙，叫“欧洲对外行动署”（EEAS）。它本应同时向欧盟各国首都和欧盟机构负责。结果却是一团乱麻。欧盟没有外交部长，只有一位“高级代表兼副主席”——这个职位名称亨利·基辛格恐怕认不出来。自2024年起，该职位由爱沙尼亚前总理卡娅·卡拉斯担任，她以对俄鹰派立场著称。尽管是迄今最引人注目的高级代表兼副主席，她的成绩并不比三位前任好多少。
Diplomatic immaturity
外交上的不成熟