The war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, has reached another inflection point(转折点). Russian forces are visibly(明显地) struggling on the battlefield as Kyiv’s strategy of making the war futile(无意义的、徒劳的) for Russia is working. But the future of European security does not hinge on(取决于) the outcome of this war alone. Even if defeated, Russia will remain the primary threat in Europe for years to come. Despite its stagnating economy, poor demographics(人口结构、人口统计), and ossifying(僵化的、骨化的) authoritarian regime, Russia remains the main power capable of and invested in upend(颠覆、倒置)ing the continent’s security architecture. Moreover, Russian military reconstitution(重组、重建) after the war is not a question of if but of when(不是是否的问题，而是何时的问题).
乌克兰战争现已进入第五年，达到了又一个转折点。俄罗斯军队在战场上明显陷入困境，基辅方面旨在让战争对俄罗斯变得毫无意义的策略正在奏效。但欧洲安全的未来不仅仅取决于这场战争的结局。即使战败，俄罗斯在未来数年仍将是欧洲的首要威胁。尽管其经济停滞、人口结构不佳、威权体制日益僵化，俄罗斯仍然是唯一有能力且有意图颠覆欧洲安全架构的主要力量。此外，俄罗斯在战后的军事重建不是会不会的问题，而是何时的问题。
Defense planner(规划者)s and analysts are divided on the severity(严重性) of the future danger that Russia’s military pose(造成、构成)s and how soon the threat could grow. Some fear that Moscow will be capable of continued aggression(侵略) soon after the war in Ukraine ends. Others believe that it may take many years to reconstitute its weakened and degraded(退化的、降级的) military. There is a sense that Russia’s losses of troops and equipment have left its forces in tatters(支离破碎、破烂不堪) and that a military incapable of(不能的) making significant advance(前进、进展)s in Ukraine can’t possibly threaten Europe.
国防规划者和分析人士对俄罗斯军队未来构成的威胁严重程度及威胁扩大的速度存在分歧。一些人担心莫斯科在乌克兰战争结束后不久就能继续侵略。另一些人则认为，重建其已被削弱和退化的军队可能需要多年。有一种观点认为，俄军的兵力和装备损失已使其部队支离破碎，一个在乌克兰无法取得重大进展的军队不可能威胁欧洲。
Current trends suggest that Russia will reconstitute(重建、重组) its military enough to pose a major threat faster than analysts expected back in 2022. It will likely take five to seven years, with Russia able to use force to threaten NATO members or Ukraine in more limited ways shortly after the current war comes to a close. Even if full reconstitution takes a few years longer, such a time frame is still short by defense planning standards. Russia will field(部署、使上场) a larger force with more drones, deep-strike capabilities(深度打击能力), and personnel than before the war. It will continue to prioritize(优先考虑) defense spending and maintain higher levels of defense industrial production(国防工业生产). But the path to reconstitution will not be easy. Historically, Russian force development has been riddled with(充满、布满) compromise(妥协、折中方案)s, overly ambitious(过于雄心勃勃的) designs, insufficient resources, and poor execution. It is often a process of two steps forward and one step back(前进两步，后退一步).
当前趋势表明，俄罗斯将以比分析师在2022年预期的更快的速度重建其军队，足以构成重大威胁。这可能需要五到七年时间，在当前战争结束后不久，俄罗斯就能以更有限的方式使用武力威胁北约成员国或乌克兰。即使全面重建需要再长几年，按国防规划标准，这样的时间框架仍然很短。俄罗斯将部署一支比战前规模更大的部队，拥有更多无人机、深度打击能力和人员。它将继续优先考虑国防开支，并维持更高水平的国防工业生产。但重建之路不会平坦。从历史上看，俄罗斯军队的发展充满了妥协、过于雄心勃勃的设计、资源不足和执行不力。这常常是一个前进两步、后退一步的过程。
RECONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
重建危机
QUANTITY OVER QUALITY
数量优先于质量
TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK
前进两步，后退一步
SUNK COSTS
沉没成本
PAST IS NOT PROLOGUE
过去并非序幕
