In June 2025, Ukraine’s security services staged an audacious(大胆的，鲁莽的) strike inside Russia. They infiltrated(潜入，渗透) the country and hid short-range attack drones in cargo trucks near a slew of(大量的，许多) Russian air bases as far away as the Amur region on the border with China. Most of these bases were home to Russian strategic(战略的，关键性的) heavy bombers—aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Using Russia’s mobile phone network, Ukrainian operatives(特工，操作人员) remotely launched the drones, successfully destroying at least ten of the bombers and damaging a total of 41 planes, including some used for nuclear command and control(指挥与控制), according to Ukrainian assessments.
2025年6月，乌克兰安全部门在俄罗斯境内发动了一次大胆的打击。他们潜入该国，将短程攻击无人机藏匿在靠近俄空军基地的货运卡车中，这些基地远至与中国接壤的阿穆尔地区。大多数基地驻扎着俄罗斯的战略重型轰炸机——能够携带核武器的飞机。据乌克兰评估，乌方特工利用俄罗斯移动电话网络远程发射无人机，成功摧毁了至少10架轰炸机，并损坏了总共41架飞机，包括一些用于核指挥控制的飞机。
Known as Operation Spider’s Web, this assault was a remarkable gambit(策略，计谋（尤指冒险的）). The most significant aspect of the attack, however, was not its astonishing(令人震惊的，惊人的) cost ratio(成本比，成本效益比)—as one analyst put it, “a single drone costing just $500 destroyed a strategic bomber worth tens of millions of dollars”—or its ingenuity(独创性，聪明才智) in hijacking(劫持（通信信号等）) Russian telecommunications, but the fact that it could happen at all. As part of its long-standing(长期存在的，由来已久的) doctrine(信条，主义，（军事）原则), Moscow had insisted that a conventional attack on its strategic assets could provoke(激起，引发（反应）) a nuclear response. But that did not stop Kyiv. Ukraine was willing to go after(追赶，打击，追捕) Russia’s nuclear capabilities, and Russia was unable to prevent their destruction.
这次袭击被称为“蜘蛛网行动”，是一个非凡的计谋。然而，这次攻击最重要的方面不是其惊人的成本比——正如一位分析人士所说，“一架仅价值500美元的无人机摧毁了价值数千万美元的战略轰炸机”——也不是其劫持俄罗斯电信的巧思，而是它竟然能够发生。作为其长期信条的一部分，莫斯科曾坚持认为，对其战略资产的常规攻击可能引发核回应。但这并没有阻止基辅。乌克兰愿意打击俄罗斯的核能力，而俄罗斯无法阻止其被摧毁。
The Ukrainian operation was a spectacular(惊人的，壮观的) example of a wider trend: nuclear deterrence(威慑，遏制) is not working. Countries have long assumed(假设，认为（多指未经验证的）) that the possession of nuclear weapons was the surest guarantee(保证，担保) of their security. Indeed, many observers saw the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as proof that Kyiv had erred(犯错，失误) in 1994 by agreeing to give up the nuclear weapons it inherited(继承（知识、财产等）) from the Soviet Union. If Ukraine had the bomb, they suggested, Russia would not have dared to attempt such an attack. Similarly, if Iran had already developed its own arsenal(军火库，武库) of nuclear weapons, Israel and the United States would not have been able to strike the country as they have since February, killing Iranian leaders and leveling(夷平，摧毁) Iranian military infrastructure. From that argument inevitably(不可避免地，必然地) flows the conclusion that more countries will reasonably want nuclear weapons as insurance against aggression. States ultimately need these weapons of mass destruction(大规模杀伤性武器) to deter their greatest adversaries.
乌克兰的行动是一个更广泛趋势的惊人例证：核威慑正在失灵。长期以来，各国一直认为拥有核武器是安全的最可靠保证。确实，许多观察家将2022年俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰视为基辅在1994年同意放弃继承自苏联的核武器是犯错的证据。他们暗示，如果乌克兰拥有核弹，俄罗斯就不敢尝试这样的攻击。同样，如果伊朗已经发展了自己的核武库，以色列和美国就无法像自2月以来那样打击该国，杀害伊朗领导人并夷平伊朗军事基础设施。从这个论点不可避免地得出结论：更多国家将合理地想要核武器作为抵御侵略的保险。国家最终需要这些大规模杀伤性武器来威慑其最强大的对手。
THE WANING OF DETERRENCE
威慑的减弱
NEW CONVENTIONS
新规范
LESS IS MORE
少即是多