美国力量的极限

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United States|November/December 2026|2026年11/12月

The Limits of American Power

美国力量的极限

U.S. Strategy and the Delusion of Force

美国战略与武力的幻觉

Published on October 20, 2026|5,175 词|C2 · 10.3|英文 40′ · 精读 169′

#us foreign policy#military strategy#iran war#vietnam syndrome#limits of power205 个知识点 · 词汇111 · 短语49 · 难句15 · 语法5 · 文化25

文章概述

本文由退役海军上将威廉·麦克雷文撰写，深入剖析美国外交政策中反复出现的错误：过度迷信军事力量，忽视权力的极限。文章以伊朗战争为切入点，回顾越战、海湾战争、阿富汗和伊拉克战争的经验教训，指出美国战略文化中“必须赢、因此会赢”的致命自负。作者认为，总统权力个人化、军队政治化以及人工智能等新技术带来的虚假掌控感，正使这种错觉愈演愈烈。他提出道德高地、地理、敌人意志、地面部队投入、时间和领导力六大限制，呼吁决策者正视战争本质，避免重蹈覆辙。

学习指导：一位四十年老兵直言：美国最大的敌人，是对自身武力的幻觉。

The war in Iran is far from the first time that U.S. policymakers have failed to appreciate(未能认识到) the limits of American power. But the Trump administration’s use of military force against the Islamic Republic since February 28 offers a particularly glaring(显眼的，刺眼的) example of a mistake that has often characterized American strategy in recent decades. The war was launched without a clear rationale(理由，根本原因) and with a constantly shifting set of objectives—from changing Tehran’s regime and squelching(压制，扼杀) its nuclear ambitions to, more recently, reopening the Strait of Hormuz(霍尔木兹海峡，全球石油运输咽喉), which wasn’t closed until the war started. The results, not surprisingly, have been bad both for U.S. interests and for the Middle East.

伊朗战争远非美国决策者第一次未能认识到美国力量的极限。但特朗普政府自2月28日以来对伊朗伊斯兰共和国动用武力，为近几十年来美国战略中屡见不鲜的错误提供了一个尤为刺眼的例证。这场战争在没有明确理由的情况下发动，目标却不断变化——从更迭德黑兰政权、扼杀其核野心，到最近重新开放霍尔木兹海峡，而该海峡直到战争开始后才被关闭。结果毫不意外，对美国利益和中东地区都是糟糕的。

Still, to focus only on the blunders(愚蠢的错误) in Iran is to miss a deeper problem in U.S. foreign policy—one that preceded and will outlast Donald Trump’s presidency. Although the particular missteps in Iran may stem from the shortcomings of this president and the team around him, the overestimation of the potential of military force has been a growing feature of American strategy since at least the end of World War II. A tendency to wish away(希望……消失，无视) the limits of power accounted for some of the greatest mistakes of U.S. statecraft(治国方略) during the Cold War, with Vietnam the clearest and most consequential(后果严重的) example. Yet despite an apparent commitment to internalizing the lessons of that overreach, this American delusion—our excessive faith in the capacity of military power to achieve victory and thereby fundamentally political ends—has gotten worse rather than better, especially in the past quarter century.(然而，尽管表面上致力于吸取那次过度扩张的教训，这种美国的错觉——我们过度相信军事力量能够取得胜利，并由此实现根本性的政治目的——却变得更糟而非更好，尤其是在过去四分之一世纪里。)

然而，只关注伊朗的失误，就会错过美国外交政策中一个更深层的问题——这个问题在唐纳德·特朗普的总统任期之前就已存在，并将比他任期更长久。尽管伊朗问题上的具体失策可能源于这位总统及其团队的缺陷，但对军事力量潜力的高估至少自二战结束以来一直是美国战略日益突出的特征。一种希望无视权力极限的倾向，导致了冷战时期美国治国方略中一些最严重的错误，越南是最清晰、后果最严重的例子。然而，尽管表面上致力于吸取那次过度扩张的教训，这种美国的错觉——我们过度相信军事力量能够取得胜利，并由此实现根本性的政治目的——却变得更糟而非更好，尤其是在过去四分之一世纪里。

And unfortunately, there is good reason to worry that the delusion will deepen in the years ahead. Presidential power is becoming increasingly personalized(个人化的) as the constraints on it continue to erode(侵蚀，削弱). The politicization(政治化) of the military (along with the diplomatic corps and intelligence communities) is making it less likely that policymakers will receive the best advice, including frank warnings(坦率的警告) about risks and costs. And the rise of artificial intelligence and new weapons technologies reinforces a sense of complete battlefield awareness and mastery, feeding superpower hubris(傲慢，狂妄). The risk of overreach has never been higher, at a time when the damage from overreach is becoming more difficult to repair.(过度扩张的风险从未如此之高，而与此同时，过度扩张造成的损害却越来越难以修复。)

不幸的是，有充分理由担心这种错觉在未来几年会加深。随着对总统权力的制约不断削弱，总统权力正变得越来越个人化。军队（以及外交使团和情报界）的政治化，使决策者越来越不可能获得最佳建议，包括关于风险和代价的坦率警告。人工智能和新武器技术的兴起，强化了一种对战场完全感知和掌控的感觉，助长了超级大国的傲慢。过度扩张的风险从未如此之高，而与此同时，过度扩张造成的损害却越来越难以修复。