These, it might seem, are good days for the Islamic Republic of Iran. After years of being diplomatically isolated, economically strangled(被扼杀；被压制), and militarily assaulted, the Iranian regime came face-to-face with its nightmare scenario(直面噩梦般的场景)—a full-blown war with Israel and Washington—and survived. The United States began bombing Iran on February 28 with the goal of destroying the country’s nuclear program, its missile program, and even its government, only to fail spectacularly at each objective.(美国于2月28日开始轰炸伊朗，目标是摧毁其核计划、导弹计划乃至政府，结果却在每个目标上都惨遭失败。) In fact, Tehran may now be stronger than it was when the war began. It successfully seized the Strait of Hormuz and shuttered(关闭；使停业) it, sending energy prices skyward(导致能源价格飙升). Its armed forces have proved capable of continuing to damage American military bases despite coming under heavy bombardment. U.S. support for the war, always weak, has fallen, and international anger at Washington has spiked(急剧上升；飙升). Little wonder, then, that many analysts think Tehran will stay the course(坚持既定路线) over the coming year.
表面上看，这些日子对伊朗伊斯兰共和国来说似乎不错。在经历了多年的外交孤立、经济扼杀和军事打击之后，伊朗政权直面其噩梦般的场景——与以色列和美国全面开战——并幸存了下来。美国于2月28日开始轰炸伊朗，目标是摧毁其核计划、导弹计划乃至政府，结果却在每个目标上都惨遭失败。事实上，德黑兰现在可能比战争开始时更强大。它成功夺取并关闭了霍尔木兹海峡，导致能源价格飙升。其武装力量已证明，即便遭受猛烈轰炸，仍能持续破坏美军基地。美国国内对战争的支持本就薄弱，如今进一步下降，国际社会对华盛顿的愤怒则急剧上升。难怪许多分析人士认为，德黑兰在未来一年将坚持既定路线。
Iranian officials are no doubt proud of how their country has fared(进展；表现) against Israel and the United States. They have publicly bragged(吹嘘；自夸) about their success and even declared victory. But in private conversations, the regime’s elites remain quite nervous. They know that the United States has many tools and tactics it can use to increase the pressure on Iran, and they are concerned that the factors that seem to be holding Washington back—dwindling stockpiles of ammunition, domestic public opinion, and international opposition—could go away, grow manageable, or otherwise become unimportant to American officials.(他们知道美国有许多工具和战术可以用来加大对伊朗的压力，并且担心那些似乎正在制约华盛顿的因素——不断减少的弹药库存、国内舆论和国际反对——可能会消失、变得可控，或者以其他方式变得对美国官员无足轻重。)
伊朗官员无疑对本国与以色列和美国的对抗表现感到自豪。他们公开吹嘘自己的成功，甚至宣布胜利。但在私下交谈中，政权精英们仍然相当紧张。他们知道美国有许多工具和战术可以用来加大对伊朗的压力，并且担心那些似乎正在制约华盛顿的因素——不断减少的弹药库存、国内舆论和国际反对——可能会消失、变得可控，或者以其他方式变得对美国官员无足轻重。
For the United States, this might seem like good news. If Tehran still fears Washington, perhaps the U.S. government can pressure Iran’s leaders into making concessions(让步；妥协). But this misreads(误读；误解) the mood in Iran’s capital. The country’s elites have been hardened(变得强硬；使 hardened) by the war, which killed their friends and family members. They see February 28, 2026, the same way Israelis see the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas—as the moment their enemy proved willing to slaughter them, and thus as proof it must be permanently defeated.(他们看待2026年2月28日的方式，就像以色列人看待2023年10月7日哈马斯的袭击一样——认为那是敌人证明自己愿意屠杀他们的时刻，因此也是必须被永久击败的证明。) They never had much faith in(对…有很大信心) American negotiators; now, they have virtually none.
对美国来说，这似乎是好消息。如果德黑兰仍然害怕华盛顿，也许美国政府可以施压伊朗领导人做出让步。但这误读了伊朗首都的情绪。该国的精英们因战争而变得强硬，战争夺去了他们的朋友和家人的生命。他们看待2026年2月28日的方式，就像以色列人看待2023年10月7日哈马斯的袭击一样——认为那是敌人证明自己愿意屠杀他们的时刻，因此也是必须被永久击败的证明。他们从未对美国谈判者抱有多大信心；现在，他们几乎毫无信心。
FEAR AND LOATHING
恐惧与憎恨
PRESS THE ADVANTAGE
利用优势
NO QUARTER
毫不留情
APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION
毁灭的欲望
ALL IN
全力以赴