“Invincible.” That was how Vladimir Putin described Russia’s latest generation of ballistic missiles in 2018. In 2022 he would unleash(释放，发动) this arsenal(武器库，军火库) to strike across Ukraine, hitting command centres, critical infrastructure and airfields. Then, in 2023, Ukraine received Patriot air defence systems from its international partners. The US-supplied missile interceptor would prove to be(证明是，结果是) an effective shield against Russian strikes.
“无敌。”这正是弗拉基米尔·普京在2018年对俄罗斯最新一代弹道导弹的描述。2022年，他动用这一武器库打击乌克兰全境，攻击指挥中心、关键基础设施和机场。随后在2023年，乌克兰从国际伙伴那里获得了爱国者防空系统。美国提供的导弹拦截弹后来证明是抵御俄罗斯打击的有效盾牌。
But this year, supplies of Patriot missiles have run out(耗尽，用完) and Kyiv has suffered the consequences. Intercepts have gone from more than 70% to none, so that night after night Russia strikes Ukraine’s infrastructure with impunity(不受惩罚地). This tragedy was long foretold(预言，预示), and there are no quick fixes.
但今年，爱国者导弹的供应已经耗尽，基辅因此遭受了后果。拦截率从超过70%降到了零，以至于俄罗斯夜复一夜地袭击乌克兰的基础设施而不会受到惩罚。这场悲剧早已被预言，而且没有快速的解决办法。
While the military narrative(叙事，说法) of the war has largely been of cheap mass-produced Ukrainian weapons overwhelming(压倒性的，势不可挡的) exquisite(精致的，精美的) Russian military hardware, most of the serious damage from Russia’s long-range strikes has come from cruise and ballistic missiles, and Ukraine’s campaign has suffered for want of(由于缺乏) them. Countering ballistic missiles is not a simple or cheap activity.
尽管这场战争的军事叙事主要是乌克兰廉价的大规模生产的武器压倒了俄罗斯精良的军事硬件，但俄罗斯远程打击造成的大部分严重破坏来自巡航导弹和弹道导弹，而乌克兰的战役因缺乏这些武器而受损。拦截弹道导弹并非简单或廉价的活动。