Almost from the moment it began, the end of the Chinese economic miracle has been much anticipated. Thick and fast(纷至沓来，密集而迅速), the books have come explaining how it will end badly. Overinvestment. A country wallowing(沉溺，陷入) in debt. The collapse of the property market. Political repression(压制，镇压). The demand for democracy from a growing middle class. All have been put forward as reasons for the inevitable(不可避免的) terminal crisis.
几乎从中国经济奇迹一开始，它的终结就备受期待。一本接一本书接踵而至，解释它将如何以悲剧收场。过度投资。深陷债务的国家。房地产市场的崩溃。政治压制。日益壮大的中产阶级对民主的渴求。所有这些都被提出来，作为不可避免的最终危机的理由。
Even those impressed by the country’s rapid growth took comfort from the notion(观念，看法) that the west would continue to dominate(主导，支配) advanced manufacturing while China would be stuck assembling TVs. And while the wait for its much-predicted demise has gone on and on, China has become the workshop of the world(世界工厂).
即使那些对该国快速增长印象深刻的人，也从这样一种观念中得到安慰：西方将继续主导先进制造业，而中国将局限于组装电视机。而就在对其屡屡预言的崩溃的等待中，中国已成为世界工厂。
This process has come in two distinct(截然不同的，明显的) phases. Initially, it is true, there was a concentration(集中，专注) on low-cost manufactured goods because cheap labour costs provided a competitive advantage. Firms left for east Asia in search of(寻找，寻求) higher profits. Without China 1.0, Donald Trump would have remained a New York property developer and Brexit might never have happened.(如果没有中国1.0，特朗普可能仍是房地产开发商，英国脱欧或许不会发生。)
这一过程分为两个截然不同的阶段。诚然，最初重点是低成本制成品，因为廉价劳动力成本提供了竞争优势。企业纷纷前往东亚寻求更高利润。如果没有中国1.0，唐纳德·特朗普可能仍是一名纽约房地产开发商，而英国脱欧或许根本不会发生。